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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY F. TYGESEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, and
~ W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY
and HOWARD RIDGE, its
Board of Trustees,
Defendants.
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
Third Party Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF
Case No. 7550

ROY F. TYGESEN, Plaintiff, appearing as his own
attorney.
ROMNEY, BOYER, and BERTOCH, 1409 Walker
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, appearing
as attorneys for Defendants.
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney General of the
State of Utah, appearing as attorney for Third·
Party Defendant.
Received two copies this ............ day of ........................... , 1950.
Attorneys for Defendant.
Attorney for Third Party Defendant.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY F. TYGESEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, and
P. W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY
and HOWARD RIDGE, its
Board of Trustees,
Defendants.
CLI~{TON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
Third Party Defendant.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff for cause of action against the Defendants alleges as follows:
I

That the Plaintiff is a taxpayer, real property
owner, a domestic water user and a prospective customer of the Defendant Company, residing within the
boundaries of an Improvement District known as the
Magna Water Company, located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
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II

That the Defendant, Magna Water Company, is
an Improvement District located entirely within the
boundaries of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, duly
and regularly created and existing by virtue of the
action of the Board of County Commissioners of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, taken under authority of
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949.
III

That the Board of Trustees is the legally constituted governing body of the Magna Water Company;
that P. W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge are
the duly elected, qualified and acting members of the
Board of Trustees of the Magna Water Company; that
the Defendant, Clinton D. Vernon, is made a party
to this action due to the fact that he is the Attorney
General of the State of Utah and that one of the purposes of this action is to attack the constitutionality of
a statute of the State of Utah, by authority of which
a governmental unit is established.
IV
That pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, a bond
election was duly and regularly conducted in the District on March 7, 1950, and as the result of said election the Board of Trustees of the Magna Water Company was and is duly and legally authorized under
the provisions of the aforesaid statute to issue general
obligation bonds of the District in the amount of $75,Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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000.00 and to issue revenue bonds of the District in
the amount of $175,000.00 for the purpose of purchasing the private water system now inadequately
serving the Magna area and for the purpose of making necessary improvements to the system.

v
That the above named Defendants, Magna Water
Company, and its Board of Trustees, are now proceeding with the preliminary steps looking toward the
immediate issuance of the aforesaid bonds.

VI
That the purpose of this Complaint is to challenge
the constitutionality of a Utah statute, to-wit: Chapter 24, Laws of Uath, 1949, by the use of this extraordinary writ, as provided for in Rule 65 B (4), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; that this extraordinary writ
is an appropriate remedy to be used by the Plaintiff
to contest the constitutionality of a statute of the
State of Utah, or portions thereof, and to arrest and
prohibit the issuance of bonds in the District in order
to prevent irreparable damage to the Plaintiff on the
grounds that such proceedings on the part of said Defendants are without, or in excess of, the jurisdiction
of the said Magna Water Company and its Board of
Trustees, due to the fact that Chapter 24, Laws of
Utah, 1949, by authority of which the Defendants,
Magna Water Company and its Board of Trustees,
exist and operate, is in violation of the Constitution of
the State of Utah.
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VII
That no other plain, speedy and adeqt1ate remedy
exists or is available to the Plaintiff to provide the
relief sought herein. That no other remedy provides a
sufficently speedy relief to meet the emergency confronting the Plaintiff and his fellow residents of the
Magna area for the follo\ving reasons :
A. The facilities in the Magna area for the supply of water to the Plaintiff and his fellow residents
are perilously inadequate.
Construction of new homes desperately
needed to house the rapidly expanding population of the area is arrested by the lack of adequate water supply; the Federal Housing Administration has refused to guarantee loans on projected home construction in the area, and the
Board of Health of the State of Utah has halted
the further construction of homes all on the
grounds that the water supply and reserves are
inadequate to support further housing.
( 1)

(2) Recent failures in the water supply system
of the area have caused numerous homes this
summer to be without water for periods of several hours at a time, and the condition of the
system threatens a serious health menace. to the
Plaintiff and to other residents of the community.
(3) Lack of reserve water supply and the defective undependable nature of the present water
facilities subject the Plaintiff and the residents
of the community to the danger of serious fire
hazards.
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B. The making of necessary improvements in the
Magna water system and the acquisition of additional
water sources for the benefit of the Plaintiff and his
fellow residents must await the decision of this Court
relative to the constitutionality of Chapter 24, Laws
of Utah 1949, and the decision of this Court as to the
authority of the Magna Water Company to issue its
bonds.
VIII
That said statute is in violation of the law and
the Constitution of the State of Utah in this:
A. That the legislature in enacting said statute
exceeded its constitutional powers.
B. That said statute violates the provisions of
Article VI,· Section 29, and Article XI, Section 5 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah in that it delegates to a special commission, private corporation or
association power to assume, supervis.e or interfere
with municipal functions, and has by special law created a corporation for municipal purposes.
C. That said statute is in violation of Article
V of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that said
statute is so vague and indefinite that were the courts.
to interpret the same the courts would be required to
act in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity.
D. That said statute violates the provisions of
Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, in this, that the statute does not proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vide for adequate review by the Courts, and in fact
prohibits or limits review.
E. That said statute violates Article I, Section
4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that it
requires qualifications to vote, and further that it violates Article IV, Sections 2 and 7 by requiring more
qualifications to vote in an election than are specified
in the Constitution of the State of Utah.
F. That said statute is in violation of Article
I, Section 7, and Article XIV, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that it deprives a man
of his property without due process of law.
G. That said statute violates Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that
it enables a city, county, town, school district or other
municipal corporation to exceed the debt limits imposed by the Constitution.
H. That the provisions of Section 8 of said statute under subheading "Proceedings on Bond Issue"
relative to advertising bonds for sale only in Salt Lake
City papers, is in violation of Article. I, Section 24 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah.
I. That Section 12 of said statute, relative to
the sale of water outside the District, is in violation
of the spirit and intent of the constitutional prohibition set forth in Article XI, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Said statute also violates
Article XI, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah in that Sections 11 and 14 of said statute authorize the Board of Trustees to establish any water
rates that it desires, whereas the Constitution provides that municipalities must provide water to their
inhabitants at reasonable charges.
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J. That Article I, Sections 1, 2 and 27 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah remind the citizens
of Utah that every citizen has certain inherent and
inalienable rights; that all political power is in the
people and that frequent recurrence to these fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government;
that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, is in violation
of these provisions of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE: Plaintiff prays that the Court
issue a Writ arresting and prohibiting the Defendants, Magna Water Company, its Board of Trustees
and P. W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, individually and as a board, from issuing any and all
bonds of the District of any nature whatsoever, and
for such other and further relief as to the Court shall
seem proper.
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1950.
ROY F. TYGESEN
Plaintiff
Received copy of foregoing Complaint this 23rd
day of June, 1950.
MARVIN J. BERTOCH
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Attorneys for Defendants,
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General of the
State of Utah, Third Party Defendant
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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY F. TYGESEN,
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vs.
MAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, and
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ANSWER
Case No. 7550

Defendants, Magna Water Company and P. W.
Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, its Board of
Trustees, for answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on file
herein, admit, deny and allege as follows:
I

Defendants admit each and every allegation of
Paragraphs I, II, III, IV and V and VII of Plaintiff's
Complaint on file herein.
II
Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph
VI of Plaintiff's Complaint to the effect that the purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pose of the Complaint is to challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, and admit
that the extraordinary writ provided for in Rule 65
B (4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the issuance
of which Plaintiff seeks in this case, provides the appropriate method to contest the constitutionality of a
statute of the State of Utah, or portions thereof, and
that it is the appropriate method by which the Court
should arrest and prohibit the issuance of the bonds
of the District should the Court determine that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, is unconstitutional, but Defendants deny that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949,
or any part thereof, is in violation of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
III
Defendants deny each and every allegation of
Paragraph VIII and each and every subparagraph
thereof.
WHEREFORE: Defendants pray that the writ
sought by Plaintiff's Complaint be denied.
MARVIN J. BERTOCH
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Attorneys for Defendants
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Received copy of foregoing Answer this 24th day
of June 1950.
ROY F. TYGESEN
Plaintiff
Magna, Utah
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY F. TYGESEN,

Plaintiff,
vs.
l\IAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, and
P. W. SEAY,B. L. CASEY
and HOWARD RIDGE, its
Board of Trustees,
Defendants.
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
Third Party Defendant.

ALTERNATIVE
WRIT
Case No. 7550

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
this Court on the 24th day of June, 1950, asking the
Court for an extraordinary writ arresting and prohibiting the Defendant, MAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, its Board of Trustees, P.
W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, individually
and as a· Board, from issuing any and all bonds of
the Magna Water Company, an Improvement District,
and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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WHEREAS, Defendants have filed an Answer
herein rendering the cause at issue, and
WHEREAS, on the 26th day of June, 1950, the
Plaintiff, Roy F. Tygesen; the Defendants, Magna
Water Company, an Improvement District, and its
Board of Trustees, by and through their attorneys,
Romney, Boyer and Bertoch; and the Attorney General of the State of Utah, by and through John Brennan, Deputy Attorney General; appeared before this
Court and they having made oral representations as
to the purpose and scope of the cause, and having
asked the court to assume jurisdiction of the cause,
and all parties having agreed to the issuance of an
alternative writ, and having agreed to submit the
matter on Briefs without further oral argument;
IT IS THEREF'ORE ORDERED that the Defendant, Magna Water Company, an Improvement
District, and P. W. Seay,. B. L. Casey and Howard
Ridge, its Board of Trustees, individually and as a
Board, be, and hereby are restrained and prohibited,
.until further order of this Court, from issuing any
and all bon,ds of the District of any nature whatsoever.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and
Defendants prepare and present Briefs on the cause
for the consideration of the Court. The Court thereupon shall determine whether or not a peremptory
writ shall be issued or denied; provided, however, that
the Court may in its discretion require further oral
argument or the filing of supplemental briefs before
deciding the cause.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney
General may join Defendants in the preparation and
submission of Defendants' Brief.
Done in Open Court this 26th day of June, 1950.
Witness the Honorable Supreme Court of the
State of Utah and the Justices thereof.
LELAND M. CUMMINGS
Clerk
Received copy of foregoing Alternative Writ this
27th day of June, 1950.
MARVIN J. BERTOCH
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Attorneys for Defendants
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY F. TYGESEN,

Plaintiff,

vs.
MAGNA WATER COMPANY,
an Improvement District, and
P. W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY
and HOWARD RIDGE, its
Board of Trustees,
Defendants.
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
Third Party Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF
Case No. 7550

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In preparing the brief in support of Plaintiff's
complaint, a summary of the admitted facts. should be
helpful in arriving at a determination of the issues involved:
The town of Magna, located in the Southwest portion of Salt Lake County, is not incorporated. It is the
fourth largest community in Salt Lake County, only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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being exceeded in population by Salt Lake City, Murray, and South Salt Lake. Magna is reported to be the
largest unincorporated densely populated area in the
United States; certainly it is the largest in Utah.
Within an approximate one square mile area is contained about 3,500 people, some 1,000 homes, and 100
places of business. In addition about two to three hundred homes, will be, or are now being, built.
Magna has a sewer system and disposal plant,
garbage collection, street lights, street maintena11ce,
fire and police protection, Justice of Peace court,
a county recreation program, all furnished by Salt
Lake County. In addition to these services, the Granite
School District maintain, operate, and manage the
schools, the Magna Mosquito Abatement District have
the responsibility of insect control. Pt1blic utilities
furnish gas, light, phone, passenger, and freight services, and culinary water. In fact, Magna has practically all services furnished under city government
except self rule. Magna is governed by the Salt Lake
County Board of County Commissioners.
The Pleasant Green Water Compa~y, a private
corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission, now furnishes culinary water to the community
for its domestic needs. Plaintiff agrees that this company does not furnish adequate service to the community in the form of pressure or fire protection. To indicate the status of the present supply, Plaintiff points
out that a fire occurred in Magna two years ago which
burned down the Junior High School. Granite School
District spent nearly a million dollars replacing this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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structure. It was contended at the time that the lack
of fire hydrants and water pressure contributed to
this loss. In any event, Plaintiff agrees that the lack of
water pressure and fire hydrants in the present system constitute a fire hazard.
Magna is in need of a large number of new homes
to house present employees of the copper mills and
smelters. In addition, the copper industry is spending
millions of dollars on a copper refinery plant which is
nearing completion. They will employ from 1,000 to
1,500 additional men. Homes in this area will be
needed for these new employees.
On the other hand, the building of new homes is
now being curtailed for the reason that the Pleasant
Green Water Company cannot supply the present
needs of the community, let alone supplying new
homes. Permits for new construction have been limited to 54, and 300 or more are needed.
Plaintiff agrees that the need for an improved
·water system is urgent, and the program of the defendants in that regard is commendable. However,
Plaintiff contends that defendants' method of accomplishing the same is in violation of law, and that
sooner or later the courts will determine that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, is uncostitutional. To do
so at a later date will cause Plaintiff and all the residents of Magna irreparable damage. Further, that
.a determination by this court at this time that this
act is unconstitutional will permit the Pleasant Green
Water Company to make needed improvements, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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justify other private or public groups to proceed with
a program that will meet the needs of Magna for an
adequate water system.
It is Plaintiff's position that the present trend is
away from incorporating into cities and towns, and
vesting more and more power in county governments,
commissions, and boards, to furnish needed facilities to
unincorporated areas. Plaintiff concedes that the very
purpose of the law now being considered in this proceedings was to permit unincorporated areas of the
state to obtain adequate water and sewer facilities
for their communities without being required to incorporate. Plaintiff makes no arguments against the
advisability of such a trend. Plaintiff's only contention in bringing this action is to have the court determine how far the legislature might go along this line,
and still remain within constitutional limitations.
So far as the present case is concerned, Plaintiff
concedes that the Magna Water Company, an improvement district, was set us in accordance with the
requirements of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949. Further that the above named defendants are the duly
elected, qualified, and acting Board of Trustees of
the MAGNA WATER COMPANY, an improvement
district. That all steps taken up to the present time
are in accordance with that law, and if Chapter 24,
Laws of Utah 1949, is constitutional, then the above
named defendants should proceed with their program
of selling bonds and improving the Magna Water Sy&tem to a point where an adequate water supply and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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distribution system is furnished the people of this
area.
Plaintiff also admits that there is a dire need for
this improvement from the standpoint of health, comfort, fire protection, and the economic growth of the
community. It is Plaintiff's understanding that there
is no dispute as to issues of fact, and defendants in
their brief will so indicate.
Plaintiff is his own attorney in this matter, not
so much from a matter of choice, as expediency. He
feels that the court should know that as a resident of
the community of Magna and as an attorney, he has
for years worked with civic groups and other attorneys on legislation that would permit the community
of Magna to own its own water system without incorporation. In this connection Plaintiff has actively participated in preparing this law and the law it replaced
and lobbied for the passage of both laws. After this
law was passed, Plantiff actively participated in the
necessary steps leading up to the creation of the defendant Water Company, and the bond election. In
fact, Plaintiff anticipates a substantial legal fee for
services rendered, conditioned on this court holding
this law constitutional. Plaintiff feels that the court
is entitled to know these facts.
On the other hand, Plaintiff is extremely anxious
that the court pass on the validity of this act, and if
it violates the constitution in any regard, to have this
court now determine that matter. A decision so holdSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing, at a later date, vvould result in costly delay and
irreparable damage to Plaintiff and residents of
Magna.
In preparing this brief, Plaintiff has kept in mind
his responsibility to the court to submit all matters
that might be helpful in a determination of the issues.
Plaintiff has endeavored, with the able assistance of
a number of other interested attorneys and parties,
to so do. Any deficiencies of Plaintiff's brief in this
regard should be charged to his lack of ability, rather
than to his sincere effort to submit a brief that would
assist the court in determining the issues here involved.
In reading this court's recent decision relative
to the constitutionality of similar laws, Plaintiff feels
that it would be presumptions on his part to seriously
contend that these decisions should not be sustained.
In view of the enormous amounts of monies spent by
various districts and the benefits resulting to the people of the state in such programs in reliance on this
court's decision, Plaintiff can only agree that the
trend of the courts and the legislature toward vesting
more and more authority in these "Quasi-municipal
corporations" is salutory.
To indicate this trend toward vesting more and
more rights and duties in "Boards", and "Quasi-municipal corporations", see 43 Corpus Juris 12-13 page
73; and Volume 1 McQuillan Municipal Corporations,
second edition, paragraphs 134-135 at page 399. It
appears these quasi-municipal corporations have been
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created for almost every conceivable purpose and held
to be constitutional by the courts.
Unfortunately the courts have made a liberal
interpretation of the various state constitutions so as
to hold these laws creating special "districts" constitutional, but have failed to be as liberal in determining that constitutional limitations on cities, towns,
and counties should apply to "districts".
McQuillan (cited above) gives a long treatise on
the origin of city and town government and traces
their history to the present trend of vesting more and
more powers, duties, and rights in "Quasi-municipal
corporations".
It is Plaintiff's position that if the court continues to sustain the present trend toward vesting
more and more authority in "Boards" and "Special
Districts", or "Quasi-municipal corporations", then
the court should establish some standards as to how
far the legislature might go in these matters and still
remain within constitutional limitations. In the present case, Plaintiff contends that the legislature far exceeded its authority and constitutional limitations in
enacting Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949.
Plaintiff in his brief will attempt to follow the
objections as set out in his complaint under paragraph
8 page 3 thereof and refer to them under the caption
as ·contained therein. (Pages 8-9-10 of this brief.)
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LEGISLATURE EXCEEDED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
(8A) This of course is all inclusive and the
contentions of Plaintiff as to unconstitutionality will
be set out in more detail later.
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO SPECIAL
COMMISSIONS
( 8B) The question of delegation of powers to
special "Boards" such as in this law "Chapter 24,
Laws of Utah 1949" has been sustained by this court.
The makers of Utah's constitution went to great
length in setting up the powers of cities and towns, as
well as limiting the power of the legislature to interfere with these powers. Little is said in our constitution on the powers of county government. It is apparent that in 1895 the makers of the constitution never
anticipated that the activities of County Commissioners would expand to their present status. To illustrate,
in 1895 activities of County Commissioners was
minute. Compare that to today's condition. In Magna,
the Board of County Commissioners control and regulate police and fire prot~ction, light the streets, collect
garbage, surface streets, clear streets and sidewalks
of snow in winter, put in curb, gutters, and si~ewalks,
operate the sewer and tell users how, where, when,
and at what price they can use the sewer. They select
the men who run the Mosquito District and collect the
taxes to operate the district. They pass regulations as
to buildings, license and control business. They even
number the houses. In fact, the powers of the Board of
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County Commissioners over the community of Magna
are almost identical ·with that of cities and town
fathers over their communities.
In the law before the court, at Section 1 (2), it
is provided that a district cannot include cities or
towns. Accordingly the question under consideration
must be limited to whether or not this is a delegation
of powers to "Boards" that should properly vest in
County Commissioners.
Utah's constitution is not expansive as to powers,
duties, and limitations of county government. Article
VI Section 26 lists a number of limitations on the legislature. (3), (8), (11), (16) particularly apply to
counties. Section 29 of the same article prohibits the
delegation of "municipal functions". If the word
"municipal" is limited to cities and towns, then the
law before the court is not affected. Plaintiff contends
the word "municipal" includes normal county functions considered in the light of present conditions. Article XI Sections 1-2-3-4 and 5 relate to county government. Again the word "municipal" is used. Section 5
says no "corporation for municipal purposes" shall be
created.. The next line specifes that the legislature
shall provide for incorporation of cities and towns.
The only conclusion that can be reached is that
the makers of our constitution intended to distinguish
between "cities and towns", and "municipal corporations".
Again at Section 6 of the same article "municipal
corporations" is used. Article XIII Section 5 vests in
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the county power to levy taxes for its own purpose,
and prohibits the legislat11re from so doing. Article
XIV Section 3-4-5-6-7 sets up debt limitations on counties.
Does the present law violate these provisions of
the constitution by delegating powers of the county
in "Boards"? Plaintiff contends that it does.
At the present time Salt Lake County is actively
engaged in vestigating the advisability of creating a
county distribution system for culinary water and
sewer systems. In vievv of the many expanded activities of County Commissions, Plaintiff believes that
the courts would consider furnishing water a part of
their "municipal function". Now can the legislature
delegate to a "District" this municipal function? Certainly the courts would not approve a "District" for
the purpose of operating the Salt Lake County Hospital, taking care of roads and bridges, making county
surveys, or. the many, many duties now .carried on by
the Salt Lake County Commissioners.
The legislature went into detail in delegating
powers to counties. In Utah Code Annotated 1943 the
following is shown: 19-4-1 says counties are bodies·
corporate and politic and have powers vested and
necessarily implied. 19-4-2 says county commissioners
shall govern the county. 19-5-17 authorizes the county
commission to divide the county into precincts and into
road, sanitary, and other districts. 19-5-19 says counties may supervise officials and officers of districts
and other subdivisions of the county. 19-5-27 says they
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may license, regulate, tax, and control all activities in
the county, pass ordinances and enforce them by fine
and imprisonment. 19-5-28 to 50 inclusive list additional rights, duties, and powers of county commissioners. 19-5-35 says that they can regulate sanitation.
19-5-43 provides they may buy, sell, control, and construct reservoirs, dams, canals, and fix the price for
water. 19-5-50 says they can perform all acts necessary to discharge their duties as county commissioners. In fact the reading of Chapter 19 of Utah Code
Annotated· 1943, and subsequent legislation, clearly
establishes that the legislature intended to vest in
county commissioners almost the same powers as are
vested in cities.
Plaintiff concedes that the courts have repeatedly held the legislature has the power to grant or take
away powers, subject to limitations of the state constitution. The problem that is presented here is, does
the limitation imposed by Article XI Section 5 of our
constitution apply to counties insofar as a water district is concerned. Article VI Section 26, at the end
thereof says, "In all cases where a general law can be
applicable, no special law shall be enacted". Certainly
Title 19 is a generalla.w and can be applicable.
If this law is constitutional, then what powers of
the County Commissioners are taken away as set out
in Title 19 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Are conflicting statutes repealed? To illustrate: suppose the county wanted to buy the same water supply that the defendants wanted to buy. Who would have priority?
Suppose the county decided to establish the price of
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water in the county; then what happens to the provision of Chapter 24 Laws of Uath 1949 which says
the Trustees shall set water rates?
Plaintiff admits that he is at a loss to define the
meaning of the word "municipal" or "municipal function" as used in our constitution, nor has he been able
to find much aid in the cases read. 43 Corpus Jt1ris,
paragraph 1, page 65; paragraph 3, page 68; and paragraph 12, pages 73 and 74 deal with the problem.
McQuilla11 Municipal Corporation, second edition, Vol.
I, page 383, paragraph 128 deals with this matter.
43 Corpus Juris paragraph 6, page 70 says a
municipality is designed to preserve its own type of
life, rules, and regulations. When it furnishes 11tilities
it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 43, page 417 says
counties are "Quasi-corporations for municipal purposes, and the organizing of a county is the vesting in
the people of such territory, such corporate rights and
powers". On the other hand, 15 Corpus Juris paragraph 103, page 457 indicates the legislature has full
power to enlarge or delete the powers of counties.
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 277, page 573 indicates that counties have only such powers as are expressly granted them by the legislature.
In the case of Leh.i City vs. Meiling, City Recorder
(Utah case decided July 16, 1935) 48 Pac. 2nd 530,
the court said, at page 535, "None of the municipal
functions of the component cities or towns is conferred
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on or delegated to the Metropolitan Water District.
Each of such cities and towns will possess and may
continue to exercise every municipal function it now
has. There need be no friction between the two, but
the closest cooperation is contemplated and should result."
In the same case at pages 540-541 the court after
discussing the classifications says "a metropolitan
water district is not a municipal corporation." Later
the court says "The characterization 'Quasi-municipal' we think accurate".
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion in the same
case at pages- 545-49 discusses at length this problem
of encroachment by special boards on municipal functions. At page 546 Judge Wolfe says "A study of this
and like provisions in other constitutions reveal the
fact that it appears in those other constitutions in
connection with other sections which give it more distinctly the content of purpose to prevent interference
by the legislature with local self government, especially in the matter of such local units handling their property, improvements, and money. We believe the fundamental purpose of this whole section (Article VI
Section 29) was to prevent interference with local self
government".
At page 548 Judge Wolfe suggests that no public
agency could be given power by the legislature to tax
people for purposes of performing municipal functions which a municipality is doing or could do.
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In the same case Judge Moffat in a dissenting
opinion classifies these "Boards" or "Districts" as
a "hybrid entity". He contends they are merely an
indirect method of violating the constitutional limitation on delegation of municipal power, debt limitations, and other such limitations. He said "The courts
should carefully scrutinize this 'hybrid entity' and
rather than determi!le everything in favor of constitutionality, should require strict compliance with
constitutional limitations imposed on 'municipal corporatons' ".
In the case of Upper Blue Bench Irrigation District vs. Continental National Bank and Trust Company, (Utah case d~cided October 25, 1937) 72 Pac.
2nd 1048, the court says an irrigation district is a department of state government and exempt from attachment or garnishment. Again in the case of Beard
vs. Board of Education of North Summit School District, (Utah case decided Deceber 10, 1932) 16 Pae.
2nd 900, the court held that the powers of a district
are almost unlimited and the courts will not interfere
with discretionary action of boards. To the same effect is Salt Lake County vs. Salt Lake City, (Utah
case decided April 30, 1913) 134 Pac. 560. It appears
there is no limitation on what the legislature can do
in delegation of power to "Districts", "Boards", and
"Commissions". Judge Straup in an opinion of his
own on the matter indicated that our state constitution was being broken down and its limitations disregarded.
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. In the case of Pattereck vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District, (Utah case decided January 26,
1944) 145 Pac. 2nd 503, 106 Utah 55, the court said
at page 511, "Should a board act in a manner which
would be unconstitutional there is nothing in the act
itself which would preclude a person aggrieved from.·
resorting to the courts to have his rights protected."
At page 511 and 512 the court says statutory limitations as to corporations for "municipal purposes", sale
of water, debt limitations, limit on yearly taxation
"apply only to cities, towns, and villages - and do
not apply to water conservancy districts. which are not
municipalities within the contemplation of that term
used in the constitution". In the same case this statement is made "The legislature had the power to create
a water conservancy district by its· own fiat. It need
not have given any .individual or group the right to
petition for the creation of a district. It was within
its discretion to determine what qualifications, if any,
a petitioner for the creation of a district must have,
since the petition for the formation of the district itself do not effect any property rights. Had the legislature created the district it could have provided for
a tax on all property within the district to pay for
the costs and maintenance of the project".
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion at page 513
says "The Plaintiff has assumed that due P.rocess of
law requires that landowners whose lands are likely
to be embraced by the district, be given a chance to
determine whether or not they want such a district.
This however is not the law".
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In the case last cited an aggrieved person is assured he can resort to the courts to have his rights
protected. In view of the present trend of decisions
relative to these "Districts", a person aggrieved has
no rights for the court to protect.
Plaintiff strongly urges that the courts should
follow the suggestions of Judge Straup and Judge
Moffat, and clearly set out the limitations of said districts, and determine that the word municipal and the
term "municipal functions" as used in our constitution should be clearly defined. Further that no special
law creating districts shoudl be approved where a
general law vests that power in counties or cities and
towns; unless the legislature by express and explicit
direction repeal the general law on the statute books.
Unless the courts do step in and clarify this matter,
our statutes will so conflict that no one will know how
he is governed or by whom.
Plaintiff seriously contends that Chapter 24
Laws of Utah 1949 is unconstitutional as being an
improper delegation of power, the creation of districts without limitations, and in conflict with general
laws already established.

REQUIRES THIS COURT TO ACT IN A LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY.
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 C) Article V of our constitution prohibits the courts from making laws. It
is the position of Plaintiff that Chapter 24 Laws of
Utah 1949, is so vague and uncertain that the courts
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will from time to time be required to interpret most
of the statute and in so doing will defeat the intent
and purpose of the legislature. Plaintiff draws to the
court's attention a few of these matters that would
require interpretation by the courts:A. · Section 1 provides "and the boundaries of no
district shall overlap the boundaries of any other district". Magna has its own sewer district, with about
the same area as included in the Magna Water Company District. The Magna Mosquito Abatement District, the Granite School District, the proposed Salt
Lake County Water Conservancy District, all include
the area covered by the Magna Water Company. Does
the wordi~g "any other district" refer to these districts? Why did the legislature make this limitationto avoid overlapping? Dual taxation? Dual regulations? Dual control?
B. Section 3 provides "where title to any real
property in the district is held in the name of more
than one person, all the persons holding title thereto
must join in the signing of the written protest. Plaintiff knows of one piece of property in the district
owned by five brothers and sisters, and the brothers'
wives do not appear on the deed. Suppose one of the
five refused to sign? Suppose a wife refused to sign?
C. Sections 3 and 5 provide "The deed records
of the county shall be accepted as final and conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the real property of the
district". Suppose the owner fails to record his deed?
(This actually occurred.) Suppose the owner is dead.
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Can his administrator, executor, or heir vote? Suppose
a man is buying under contract and owns 99% of the
equity? These provisions may be constitutional, but
certainly are inequitable and discriminatory.
D. Section 6 provides "The election shall be held
-in the manner at such time provided by the laws of
Utah for the holding of elections on the issuance of
'Court House Bonds by counties'". Plaintiff (and a
number of other attorneys including Mr. Bertoch, attorney for defendants) has been unable to find any
constitutional or legislative provisions in Utah relative to court house bonds.
E. Section 7, "Qualification of voters", prescribes who may vote on the bond election and for trustees. Does "pay a property tax" mean real property personal property - auto - income and/or sales tax?
Does "in the year next preceding the election" eliminate veterans exempt from paying real property from
voting?
F. Section 7, "Powers of Trustees", is so general in its nature that neither the trustees nor the
courts could determine the intent and purpose of the
lgislature. The same applies to Sections 11 and 14.
The foregoing are set out for the purpose of
indicating to the court a few of the issues that could
be raised under this law. If the court should determine
these issues, would the law still carry out the original
intent and purpose of the Legislature?
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Plaintiff is aware of this court repeatedly holding that matters not properly before the court will not
be determined. He should like to impress upon the
court the fact that if the Trustees of the Magna Water
Company obtain $250,000.00 from the sale of bonds,
spend the money, incur obligations, etc., and then
these matters are brought to the attention of the
court, it is too late to remedy them, and Plaintiff and
residents of Magna will have suffered irreparable
damage.
·Plaintiff seriously contends that if the legislature
has power to cre~te "Quasi-municipal corporations"
as is done here, the court should insist that these laws
should be definite and certain. The constitution is
explicit in what cities and towns can and cannot do.
Should not the same be required by "Districts"?
LIMITS OR PROHIBITS REVIEW BY THE
COURTS.
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 D) Article I Section 7
and 11 guarantee to every person his day in court.
However, this law not only fails to provide for review,
but prohibits or limits the same. Keeping in mind the
court's ruling in the Carbon Conservancy District
case, and the Metropolitan Water District case, Plain..
tiff contends that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is
unconstitt1tional in this:Generally speaking this entire law vests exten..
sive rights in the County Commission and "Trustees"
but is silent as to any right to review these actions.
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Specifically, Section 3 provides that a protestant
has only thirty days to file his protest in the district
court, and limits the grounds for said review. It precludes the right to object or go into court after the
thirty days; even then the district court can only determine whether the property is benefited, and whether the district was created in compliance with this
statute.
Plaintiff draws to the court's attention this fact:
the only thing the protestant had before him at that
time was (a) the boundaries of the district, and (b)
a general statement as to purpose. The last portion of
Section 3 provides "The provision of the petition shall
be not considered to be a limitation on the right of
the Board to submit a bond issue in whatever amount
and for whatever improvement may be found desirable after the District has been organized''.
Let us assume this hypothetical case. Protestant
wants a new water supply and favors the general purpose and boundaries. In the resolution the commission
estimates the costs to be fifty thousand dollars. Protestant thinks that's fine; and endorses the creation
of the district. Thirty-one days after the district is
created, fifty property owners present a petition for
a bond election calling for a bond issue of $250,000.00.
What happens to protestant's rights to object? Thirty
days have passed. His "failure to apply for such writ
of review within said time shall foreclose all owners
of property within said district as so established from
the right to further object thereto".
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Suppose protestant does not agree with the many
matters the commission may do in calling a bond election, such as whether the signers of the petition are
property owners, sufficiency of notice, is the improvement beneficial, is the extent of proposed improvements excessive, are the boundaries or assessed valuation correct, whether written protests represent half
the assessed valuation. What can protestant do? "File
a written protest". The County Commission says by
resolution, the written "protests so filed represent less
than half of the assessed valuation of the real property in the district". 'The County Commission do not
even have to have a definite determination of the assessed valution of the district. The statute says "The
board may require" such a report. Now the legislature
· steps in and in the final portion of Section 5 says "If
any written protests are filed, and ·the board shall
determine that the protests so filed represent less than
half of the assessed valuation of the real property in
the district, the resolution or order of the Board calling the election shall contain a recital to that effect",
and such recital shall be binding and conclusive for
all purposes. Is that conclusive as to review by the
courts?
Protestants' only recourse is to vote down the
bond issue. It seems that up to this point three county
commissioners and fifty property owners decide the
fate of a community consisting of 3,500 people or
more. The burden of defeating the bond election is an
excessive burden on protestant. The statute provides
no recourse to the courts for review.
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Now the bond issue carries, the protestant is
lulled into a sense of security by a representation by
the trustees to the effect "that they will not issue
bonds for the full amount voted-$250,000.00-and
points out to the protestant the portion of Section 8
under "proceedings on bond issue" to the effect "May
---issue such bonds or such amount thereof as it
may determine". The "Trustees" proceed to advertise
and sell the bonds, and in selling them, "shall recite in
their resolution that they are issued under the authority of this Chapter" (24). The legislature then says
in Chapter 24, Section 10, "Such recital shall conclusively import full compliance with all of the provisions of this Chapter, and all bonds issued containing such recital shall be incontestable for any cause
whatsoever after their delivery for value".
Section 8 under "proceedings on bond issue" provides "all bonds not issued payable solely from such
revenues shall be the general obligations of the district and the full faith, credit and resources of the district shall be pledged for the payment thereof". Section 9 says the County Commission must levy taxes to
pay this obligation. Section 7 under "annual budget"
provides ''such taxes shall be extended and collected in
the manner provided by law for the collection of general county taxes . . . " "All laws applicaple to the
imposition, collection, and enforcement of general
county taxes, including those pertaining to the allowance of collection fees, to the imposition of penalties
for delinquencies and to the sale of property for nonpayment of taxes, shall be applicable to the taxes so
levied for the district".
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Section 14 provides that the Board may adopt a
resolution for publication as to what the board has
done. Protestant has thirty days to contest the legality
of the Board's action, and thereafter "no one shall
have any cause of action to contest the regularity, formality, or legality thereof for any cause whatsoever".
Suppose they do not publish the resolution? Merely
adopt it?
Plaintiff seriously contends that Chapter 24 Laws
of Utah 1949 is in direct violation of Article I Section 7 and 11 of our constitution, in that it not only
fails to provide for aqequate review, but in fact directly prohibits review, or makes possible residents of
the community being lulled into a sense of security
until the time to exercise their right to review have
.. passed.
In reading cases on this matter Plaintiff found
these citations that might be helpful:
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 125 at page 473-474
says "appeals from decisions of county boards are not
a matter of right, and are allowable ony in cases provided by statute". At page 474 it is indicated that no
recourse can be had to courts where statute provides
the determination shall be con.clusive. Paragraph 127
page 475 indicates that a limitation on time to appeal
a decision of a "District" or county board controls
and unless recourse to the courts is taken within the
time specified, the protestant has lost his right.
On the other hand, this court in the case of Argyle vs. Johnson, 118 Pac. 487, seriously criticized
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the "act" there involved for its failure to provide for
and its limitations on right to review by the courts. At
page 492 the court said, "When, however, a drain is
proposed or constructed and an assessment made and
a tax levied upon such lands, upon the grounds they
are improved or benefited by such drain, and such
tax is declared a lien upon the land, to discharge which
the land may be sold, then the landowner is being affected in his property rights and is entitled to be
heard before the tax and lien are irrevocably established".
In the same case the court said at page 493 "Such
laws are salutary and should be reasonably construed,
and unless violative of some fundamental or constitutional right, should be upheld. In adopting such
laws, however, the rights of all interested persons
must be recognized and protected, and an opportunity
to be heard must be given". At page 493 the court
suggests that "hearings" be before some disinterested
parties, not before the one whose acts are being reviewed.
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, already cited,
this court at page 536 said, "The right to be heard before a competent tribunal on the question of benefits
is essential to avoid running counter to the constitutional requirement of due process before the imposition of burdens which might result in depriving a
land owner of his property by means of special assessments". The court cites the Argyle case as authority.
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In the case of State ex Rel Ferry vs. Corrine
Drainage District of Box Elder County, (Utah case
decided March 27, 1916) 156 Pac. 921, at page 923
the court upheld the amended law as to a right for a
hearing and notice being adequate, and in so doing
the court said, the affected persons were given notice
of "the starting point or points, route or routes, terminal or termini and general description of the proposed work ... " relative to the drainage canal for
which he would be taxed. In other words, this court
said that when a person within the district knew
where the drains would run, he then would be in a
position to appear before the commission and be heard
as to benefits.
In the matter now before the court, the District
has been created, the boundaries set, the Trustees
elected and qualified, and a bond election held wherein these Trustees are authorized to sell general obligation bonds in the sum of $75,000.00 for which Plaintiff
can be taxed, as well as $175,000.00 revenue bonds
which Plaintiff will help to pay for in the form of a
water bill. However, up to the present time Plaintiff
is not advised as to whether the defendants will run a
new main in front of Plaintiff's home, or if he will
receive better pressure, or a different water supply.
No plans are drawn of the proposed improvements.
No one, including the defendants, know how much
they will pay to the Pleasant Green Water Company
for their system; in fact, no one knows whether the
Pleasant Green Water Company will even sell. About
one-third or two-fifths of the "District" is farm lands.
No one lrnows if these farms will ever be improved
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so as to benefit by the proposed new culinary water
system. In short, the County Commission held a hearing on the question of whether the district should be
created. At that hearing they determined all the property in the district will be benefited. Since they do
not have a plan of improvement before them how can
they know Plaintiff's property will be benefited? How
do they know farm land will be benefited? Plaintiff
can make no protest since he knows nothing about the
proposed improvements. Such a hearing is a farce.
In the above case cited the statute went to great
lengths to protect the property owners affected. Appeals from all orders of the commission could be had
any time within six months after made. The Commission's orders must be definite and certain. Before any
taxes can be levied the taxpayer knows the amount of
tax and the purpose for which it will be used. ·Taxpayers are even mailed notices of the amount of each
assessment, and a right to be heard as well as a right
to appeal to the courts for review. Plaintiff here does
not know the amount of his taxes that will be assessed,
the water rate he will pay or what the money will be
used for.
The same arguments apply to the provisions of
the Metropolitan Water District Act and the Water
Conservancy Act. It is understandable that the court
would hold them constitutional. The constitution, Article XI Section 5 under (A) says " . . . to levy and
collect special assessments for benefits conferred".
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A distinction is made in the cases read by Plaintiff between the levy of a general over-all tax or ad
valorem tax, and a special assessment tax.
In the Argyle vs. Johnson case the court apparently considered the levy to be imposed as a special
assessment tax and required notice, hearing, and right
of review by the courts. The court stressed the point
that where a tax is levied for the improvement or
benefit of land, the owner is entitled to be heard as to
benefit before the tax is levied.
In the case of Whitcher vs. Bonneville Irrigation
District, (Utah case decided May 2, 1927) 256 Pac.
785, the irrigation district expanded the district but
never furnished water. The court said that this was
a special improvement tax or assessment. At page 788
this court said "Special taxes are levied on the theory
that the landowner receives benefits for the taxes
which he is required to pay".
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, the court
considered the act for Metropolitan Water Districts.
At page 536 the court indicated that taxes levied are
not assessments for benefits, but is an ad valorem tax
similar to general taxes and is "not an assessment for
benefits as such is known in connection with drainage,
irrigation, and other special assessment districts".
Again at page 536 the court refers to the distinction
as to "special assessments". Again at page 536-537
the court cites with approval a California case that
held a tax to obtain a source of water was a general
tax and not a special improvement tax.
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At page 540 in the same case the court said
"There is a marked distinction between such districts
(irrigation, drainage, and mosquito) where assessments may be levied based on the benefits to the property included, and a metropolitan water district where
taxes may be levied on the value of all the property
within the district".
In the case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District the court apparently ,considered this
act two-fold, part of the taxes were general and part
special. The court held the act met the requirement of
due process, and at page 511 said, "It is the public
purposes for which a water conservancy district is
organized that distinguishes it from a drainage or irrigation district. The public purposes for which a water conservancy district is organized inures to the
benefit of the public generally and therefore the public
can be charged for such benefits through general taxation".
Again at page 511 the court said, "Classes B, C,
and D refer to taxes to be imposed for special benefits.
Sections 100-11-17, 100-11-18, and 100-11-19 provide
for the voluntary application of municipalities, irrigation districts or individuals for the special benefits
they wish to obtain. These sections contain provision
for notice to all persons interested and for hearing before the Board. Section 100-11-21 provides for hearing
of objections to assessments to be levied and for notice
by publication to all persons interested. It also contains a provision for appeal to the District Court from
the findings of the Board. These sections fully provide
for all the safeguards of a party's rights".
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In that case the court held unconstitutional that
portion of the act (100-11-7) denying a right of appeal.
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion at page 513
said "that no constitutional rights would be violated
so long as notice and hearing were given on the
amount of the assessments". Again at page 514 he
said, "A district could be organized without notice
or hearing so long as each landowner was given a hearing on the question of whether his lands have been
benefited and should be assessed to pay for the said
improvement". I wonder if Judge Wolfe used the
words "was" and "have" intentionally? At least the
party being assessed should know the particulars of
the benefits before the hearing has been had.
The above case is cited with approval in the case
of In Re Arch Hurley Conservancy District, 191 Pac.
2nd 338 (New Mexico case decided January 2, 1948).
That court cites Carbon Water Conservancy District
case with approval, but in so doing, at pages 343-344,
they refer to the act itself to substantiate the court's
holding, that is "That property within the proposed
disrict shall be benefited ... " "It is apparent therefore that the act makes provision for a hearing as to
whether or not lands included in the proposed boundaries will be benefited". In the same case at page 344
the court emphasizes these words " ... includes the
findings of benefits to each and every tract included
in the project".
The Carbon Water Conservancy District case was
again cited with approval in the case of Nebraska Mid-
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state Reclamation District vs. Hall County, (Nebraska case decided February 24, 1950) 41 N. W. 2nd
397. Here the court at page 407 point out their legislature adopted a water conservancy act similar to that
of Colorado and Utah and cite the Utah decision with
approval only after pointing out the detailed protection given the property owner affected by the act
itself.
If this matter of right of notice, hearing, and
appeal is only given in case of special improvement
taxes for benefits, then the question arises, is the
taxes provided by Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949 a
special improvement tax, or a general or ad valorem
tax? Plaintiff contends the tax can only be interpreted
as being a special improvement tax.
Plaintiff can assure this court that if he is going
to be taxed without receiving direct benefits in the
form of better water, better pressure, and fire protection for his home (not his neighbor or the people in
other parts of the town) then he certainly would object to the creation of the district, or at least being included in the district. Unfortunately even the defendants have no idea whether such direct benefits will
ever be furnished Plaintiff or any other particular individual piece of property in Magna. On the other
hand, the District was created in December of 1949 or
January of 1950. The law said Plaintiff must file his
objections then or appeal the matter to the District
Court within thirty days. (Section 3 of the Act.)
Plaintiff can raise no objection now. His thirty days
have passed. On the other hand Plaintiff even now
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(July 1950) has no idea as to what direct benefits
he will receive, or when they will be received, if ever.
He can be quite sure that the $250,000.00 will be paid
by him and his fellow residents in the form of taxes
or increased water bills.
In this same connection as to whether the tax is
special or general, the act itself says: "The title is Improvement District- the word Improvement appears
twice in the caption. Section 1 provides for the creation of Improvement Districts. Section 3 says "describe the nature and extent of the improvements proposed". The same section provides "In such resolution
establishing such district, the Board of County Commissioners shall eliminate from said proposed district
any property originally included therein, but which
it shall determine will not be benefited by the proposed improvement". The writ of review to the district court can be based only on the grounds of "no
benefits" or failure to follow the provisions of the
law. Through the entire act, the matter of benefits
predominates.
Section 5 of the act provides that the resolution
adopted by the County Commission, among other
things must contain a finding "that the proposed improvement would be for the benefit of all taxable
property situate in the district".
Plaintiff contends that Chapter 24 Laws of Utah
1949 places these taxes in the category of a special assessment. The act itself so describes it. If that be true
then this act is unconstitutional for the reason it pro-
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vides no right of appeal and in fact prohibits it in
some cases, and where the right to review is provided
for, the protestant does not know what the program
of the Trustees call for and so cannot determine whether to protest or favor their actions.
LIMITATION ON RIGHT TO VOTE.
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 E) Our Utah constitution provides at Article I Section 4, in the last line "no
property qualification shall be required of any person
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this constitution. Article IV sets up additional rights. Section
7 of this article places limitations on this right when
it involves special taxes or the question of creating
indebtedness.
Plaintiff appreciates that limitations on the
voters' rights to vote on these issues of special taxes
or indebtedness have been repeatedly sustained by our
courts. However, he contends Chapter 24 Laws of
Utah 1949 exceeds all these limitations and is in violation of these constitutional provisions.
Section 7 under "qualification of voters" is discriminatory in this, that a person who owns property
in the district, but resides outside can vote on the bond ·
0

ISSUe.

Only those who have "paid a property tax in the
district in the year next preceding the election shall be
permitted to vote" on the proposed bonds. If property
tax is interpreted to mean "real property" then the
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limitation ·is certainly discriminatory. If it means personal property and at1to taxes, then it is more comprehensive. If it includes sales tax or income tax, then it
would permit almost everyone to vote.
Plaintiff points out to the court this fact. The
bond issue already approved by the people of Magna
calls for $175,000.00 revenue bonds and $75,000.00
general obligation bonds. Who pays the revenue? The
water user? Can he vote on the issuance of bonds if
he has not paid a property tax? In addition to this,
the Magna Water Company has already outlined its
plan to realize enough money from sale of water to
meet its obligations and no tax levy is anticipated.
This is a common occurrence with water companies.
So the man who does not pay "a property tax in the
district" and uses water, pays the bill but cannot vote
on the bond issue. If this bill provided that the bond
issue would be paid in whole by taxes, it probably
would not be in violation of the constitution. On the
contrary, this bill specifically provides at Section 9
"payments from revenue" " . . . the bonds may be
issued in such manner as not to be payable from taxes
but to be payable solely from the revenues ... ". Even
though the resolution calling for a bond election included the above provision, the law still limits the
voters to those who "paid a property tax". If the consumer of the water is going to pay for the bonds, he
should have the right to vote at the bond election.
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NO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 F) The matters heretofore set out and particularly those relative to 8D support Plaintiff's position that Chapter 24 Laws of
Utah 1949 are unconstitutional in that a resident of
the area is deprived of his property without due process of law.
All cases read by Plaintiff support the proposition that "due process of law" is a vested and precious
right that should be safeguarded. In the Whitcher
case at page 789 this court said, "To uphold taxes
against appellants lands complained of in this proceeding would result in taking property without any
consideration or benefit received whatsoever. A mere
statement of this proposition convinces that it is repugnant to every equitable consideration and falls little short of confiscation. As we understand the authorities, taxes under facts such as here appear have
never been upheld." In that case the court held the
taxes already assessed to be null and void. Unfortunately for the people of Magna such a procedure would
be of little help. If these Trustees are permitted to sell
bonds and spend the money, the damage is done. ·
AUTHORIZES COUNTIES TO EXCEED
DEBT LIMITATION
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 G) So far as Plaintiff
can .determine no Utah case on this problem has directly determined the question of debt limitation as
applied to· "Quasi-municipal corporations". Utah's
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constitution is explicit in setting up debt limitations
on town, city, county governments as well as school
boards. It is generally accepted that the framers of
our constitution were anxious to limit the power to
tax, and the power to incur bonded indebtedness on
the part of all governmental agencies.
In the water conservancy act 100-11-16 Utah
code annotated, the legislature limited the taxing
power of the district to ~ mill before water was delivered and 1 mill afterwards.
In the case of irrigation districts the legislature
at 100-9-26 sets a debt limit and any obligation incurred in excess is void.
Under the Metropolitan Water District Act at
100-10-18-g Utah code annotated 1949 the legislature
prohibits any indebtedness of the district to exceed
ten per cent of the assessed valuation.
Under the Mosquito Abatement District Act, no
provision is made for bonded indebtedness of any kind,
and the legislature at 56-0-9 Utah code annotated
1943 specifies the tax rate, "and in no event shall such
tax exceed ten cents on each one hundred dollars of
taxable property in such district".
Article XIII Section 7 and 9 limits rate of taxation. Article XIV determines public debt limit.
Plaintiff can find no direct limitation imposed
by our constitution as to debts incurred by "Quasimunicipal corporations". However, it seems unthink-
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able that the makers of the constitution even considered the possibility of creating districts without
some limit as to their taxing power or amount of indebtedness they could incur.
It appears that so far as Utah is concerned the
legislature has set up debt or tax limitation or both
on these "Districts" when created. Presumably there
is no constitutional limitation on the taxing power or
debt limitations of distrcts other than that imposed
by the spirit rather than the letter of the constitution.
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 277 page 573-574
deals with the problem of debt limitation. In the case
of Lehi City vs. Meiling, already cited, this court at
page 538 said, "The total sum to which a district 1nay
obligate itself to pay must be within the limits fixed
by statute". In other words, the direct obligation and
conditional or surety obligation should be computed
together as a debt of the district and the total amot1nt
should not exceed the statutory limitation".

At pages 540 to 544 inclusive, the court extel1sively discusses the matter of debt limitation, and
holds that the debts of the distrct are not a part of
city or county debts. At page 542 the court said, "It is
true the framers of the constitution feared debt and
wisely attempted to place restrictions on the governmental subdivisions so they could not incur indebtedness in such amount as to lead to. insolvency".
Judge Moffat and Judge Hansen in the Lehi City
vs. Meiling case contend that the creation of these
"hybrid entity" districts are merely an indirect
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method of violating constitutional limitations on debt.
In the Carbon Water Conservancy District case, Judge
Moffat reiterated this position, and said, "Flexibility,
adaptability, development, and stability of law are desirable. The paths of growth and adaptability are often devious, but should not be used to evade constitutional provisions".
The question of debt liability and the maximum
amount of taxes that can be levied are of paramount
interest to the water user or resident of the district.
The Trustees under Section 11 have ''the power to
cause to be levie d as above provided, taxes on all taxable property in the district for the carrying out of
the purposes for which the district is created; provided, however, that the taxes so levied for any district, other than those levied for the pa,yment of principal of and interest on the bonds of the district, shall
not in any year exceed 4 mills on each dollar ... "
1

In other words the Trustees can levy up to 4 mills
for the carrying out of the purpose of the district or
operation costs. No limitation of any kind is shown
as to the amount of taxes the Trustees can impose to
meet the payment of general obligation bonds and
interest.
Let's assume a concrete example. Assume the assessed valuation of the Magna Water Company is one
million dollars. ·The Trustees have already been authorized at the recent bond election, to issue general
obligation bonds for $75,000.00. They can use their
own judgment as to when they will repay interest and
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principal (see Section 9). Assume further they issue
all these bonds payable annually over a ten year period
with interest at five per cent or interest for the ten
year priod of about one-fourth the bond issue or $15,750.00, a total of $93,750.00. The Trustees could agree
to pay back general obligation bonds and interest in
ten years at the rate of $9,375.00 per year. On a one
million dollar assessed valuation, this would mean
aboue nine and one-third mills per year. Under this
same statute the Trustees could levy an additional
four mills per year for operation costs, or a total annual levy of 13 1/3 mills.
In examining Plaintiff's last year's tax notice,
I find I am taxed under six different categories on
my real property. This does not include personal property tax, auto, licenses, livestock, etc., nor does it include the tax referred to above for taxes imposed by
the Magna Water Company. Incidentally, all of the
taxes referred to are collected by Salt Lake County.
The makers of our constitution in 1895 were concerned about taxes and debts. Plaintiff is vitally concerned, especially around November of each year. In
fact the matter of taxation is a serious one in our nation today. On the other hand this court has approved
drainage districts, irrigation districts, water conservancy districts, and metropolitan water districts. Under this court's rulings to date, the power of the legislature to pass laws permitting additional districts, or
even creating them of their own volition, seems to have
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no limitation. If this trend continues, the county will
not have to take Plaintiff's home for taxes - he will
give it to them.
Under the provisions of Chapter 24 Laws of Utah
1949 the Trustees must set Plaintiff's water rate at a
figure that will pay off $175,000.00 worth of revenue
bonds plus interest for some twenty years. The Trustees have already indicated my water rate would be
twice that now charged by the Pleasant Green Water
Company. When the water rate reaches a figure Plaintiff cannot afford to pay, the Trustees shut off his
water. Plaintiff is not so sure this statute does not
vest power in the Trustees to deprive Plaintiff of a
vested right without due process, since the Trustees
set the water rate without being required to have a
hearing on the matter, nor is the right for court review provided by this law.
Plaintiff appreciates that this court in the Carbon Water Conservancy District case held that the
debts of .the district could not be considered the debts
of the participating cities and towns. However, in almost all of these districts and particularly in the act
now before the court, the "district" is a creature of
the County Commission. They declare their intention
to create a district, set the boundaries and purpose,
hold the election, collect the taxes, and the County
Clerk and County Treasurer can act in that capacity
for the district. The district merely acts for and in
behalf of the County Commission to carry out a right
and duty of the county. Plaintiff seriously contends
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pany is merely a department of County government,
subject to county debt limitations and all other limitations expressed or implied in our constitution applicable to municipal corporations.
IS A SPECIAL LAW
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 H) The last line of Section 8 provides that notice of the bond sale shall be in
a paper published in Salt Lake City. This in direct
violation of Article I Section 24 of our constitution,
and Article VI Section 26.
AUTHORIZES SALE OF WATER
OUTSIDE DISTRICT
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 I) Section 11-12 IS In
conflict with the spirit and letter of the constitution
permitting sale of water of the district outside its
own boundaries without limitation, and is in violation of Article XI Section 6 of the constitution. It will
be noted that the constitution uses the words "No municipal corporation". They do not use the words "cities
or towns". Section 5 of the same article refers to "Corporation for municipal purposes". In the same section
they specify "cities and towns", indicating their intention to make a distinction. Again Section 6 Article
XI of the constitution provides "But all such waterworks, water rights, and sources of water supply now
owned or hereafter to be acquired by any Municipal
Corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at
reasonable charges. Is it not a fair interpretation that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56

this wording "municipal corporation" was intended to
refer to a district or "Quasi-municipal corporation"
of the type under consideration? The Magna Water
Company is created for the sole purpose of supplying
its residents with an adequate water supply and system, the same as a city or town. Chapter 24 Laws of
Utah 1949 specifically authorizes sale of water outside the district.
In this same connection, relative to express powers vested in the Trustees by this statute, Section 7
under the sub-head of "Powers of Trustees" provides
for compensation of Trustees and then provides "A
Trustee may be employed as. general manager of the
properties of the district at such additional compensation as may be fixed by the other two trustees, and
when so employed he shall continue to perform the
duties of Trustee". This provision is in violation of
the spirit and letter of the constitution and laws of
Utah.
Our constitution, Article VI Section 26 ( 18), and
Section 30 prohibits this type of legislation. 15 Corpus
Juris paragraph 162, 163 page 497 and 498 deals with
this matter and at 15 Corpus Juris paragraph 131
page 4 77 this appears: "On the ground of public policy, and because of express statutory prohibition in
some states, a county board cannot contract directly
or indirectly with one of its own members. A contract
so made is void".
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DEPRIVES CITIZENS OF INALIENABLE
RIGHTS
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 J) "To secure and perpetuate the principles of free government", "frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential."
In conclusion, Plaintiff strongly contends that
Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949 should be co11strued
by this court to be "in violation of the intent of the
constitution and is inconsistent with the spirit and
true intent of the same." (The quoted words are Judge
Wolfe's, not Plaintiff's.) Further that the matters
pointed out in 8B-8D-8F-8G-8H- and 81 of Plaintiff's
brief are in direct violation of express limitations contained in the constitution.
Plaintiff realizes that this court has heretofore
ruled on most matters raised herein by Plaintiff. However, a comparison of the statutes relating to drainage,
irrigation, water conservancy, and the metropolitan
water district, with Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949
will clearly show a marked difference as to matters
raised by Plaintiff in his brief. Plaintiff's position is
that the decisions of this court relatve to these various
districts can be easily reconciled so as to hold this act,
now before the court, unconstitutional, without materially affecting the decisions referred to.
Respectfully submitted,

ROY F. TYGESEN
Plaintiff.
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